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Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory 
Lending and the Subprime 
Mortgage Loan Securitization 
Pyramid Scheme 
 
Navid Vazire* 
 
0DQ\ UHFHQW DFFRXQWV RI WKH PRUWJDJH PDUNHW·V RQJRLQJ
meltdown, which is at the heart of the broader economic crisis, 
have identified numerous flaws in the manner in which 
mortgage loans were sold and securitized in recent years.  A 
number of authors have paid particular attention to excessive 
risk-­taking by Wall Street firms and investors, and have 
expressed much concern about preventing such behavior and 
its grave consequences in other financial markets.  These 
authors have identified a number of causes contributing to the 
current crisis including: (1) the unprecedented complexity of 
financial instruments and transactions,1 (2) the conflicts of 
interest facing credit ratings agencies,2 (3) the over-­
 
* Staff Attorney, Foreclosure Prevention Project, South Brooklyn Legal 
SerYLFHV ´6%/6µ 1RYHPEHU  ² June 2009;; J.D., 2006, New York 
University School of Law;; M.S., 2003, University of Texas, Austin;; B.S., 2000, 
Columbia University.  My thanks go to the staff of the Foreclosure Prevention 
Project at SBLS, and to the many consumer advocates throughout the 
country, who taught me the difficult work of representing borrowers caught 
in the complex legal and financial systems discussed in this Article. 
1. See generally, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 
193 (2008);; Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction³Structured Finance 
and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53 (2009). 
2. See generally, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM·N, REPORT ON 
1
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collateralization of real estate based on an unrealistic 
expectation of perpetually increasing values,3 (4) the 
inadequacy of disclosures made to securities investors,4 (5) 
regulatory failures,5 and (6) the incaution of securities issuers 
and investors who poured money into a complex system that 
they did not fully understand.6  Most of these commentators 
have identified mortgDJH ORDQ VHFXULWL]DWLRQ·V HYLVFHUDWLRQ RI
PRUWJDJHRULJLQDWRUV·LQFHQWLYHVWRPDNHVRXQGORDQVDVDNH\
factor in causing the crisis.  However, these authors have not 
explored the manner in which originators responded to those 
changed incentives.  Rather, these criticisms³spurred by the 
massive and unforeseen depreciation of mortgage-­backed 
VHFXULWLHV ´0%6µ7³are addressed to the modern financial 
system as a whole, rather than specifically to the subprime 
mortgage crisis, and are almost entirely focused on limiting 
investor losses and systemic collapse.  Other authors have 
described the growth of predatory mortgage lending and the 
 
THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF  
THE SECURITIES MARKETS (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf;; Christopher M. 
Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-­Private Regulatory Regimes 
in an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT·L L. 125 (2008);; David 
Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory 
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
985 (2006). 
3. See generally, e.g., Unterman, supra note 1;; Yuliya S. Demyanyk & 
Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 5, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Social Science Research 
Network), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396 (follow 
´'RZQORDGµ-RKQ.LII	3DXO0LOOVMoney for Nothing and Checks for Free: 
Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets ,QW·O 0RQHWDU\
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/188, 2007), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf. 
4. See generally, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An 
Experimental-­Asset-­Market Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 
2007 WIS. L. REV. 977 (2007). 
5. See generally, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 271 (2008);; Vincent Di Lorenzo, Federalism, Consumer Protection and 
Regulatory Preemption: A Case for Heightened Judicial Review, 10 U. PA. J. 
BUS. & EMP. L. 273 (2008);; Gerding, supra note 4;; Schwarcz, supra note 1;; 
Unterman, supra note 1;; Paul M. Schwartz, Note, Where Do We Go From 
Here? The Battle Against Predatory Subprime Lending, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 213 (2008). 
6. See generally, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3. 
7. See infra note 51. 
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culpability of securities issuers and investors in permitting this 
practice to occur.8  However, few scholars have closely explored 
the causal connection, beyond simply asserting it, between the 
occurrence of predatory mortgage lending on the one hand and 
the rise of subprime mortgage loan securitization and the 
eventual collapse of the MBS market on the other. 
In fact, the fraudulent and abusive mortgage lending 
tactics that have been documented were facilitated and even 
provoked by the securitization of mortgage loans.  First, 
securitization removed two important risks customarily 
associated with mortgages, namely (1) the risk of WKH OHQGHU·V
bankruptcy, and (2) the risk of debt-­unenforceability because of 
some illegality in the origination of the loan.9  The decoupling 
of these risks from securitized mortgage loans rendered the 
securitizers10 and investors indifferent to the business practices 
of originators, no matter how flagrant, abusive, and ultimately 
XQVXVWDLQDEOH WKH\ ZHUH  6HFRQG RULJLQDWRUV· FRPSHQVDWLRQ
depended on both the volume of loans they originated and on 
the unfavorability of the terms of those loans.11  Originators 
collected up-­front fees from borrowers, thereby encouraging 
WKHPWRGULYHXSFRVWV  ,QDGGLWLRQ WKH\FROOHFWHG´RXWVLGHRI
FORVLQJµ IHHV IURPVHFXULWL]HUV WKDWZHUHEDVHGRQ ORDQ WHUPV
including interest rates, prepayment and other penalties, and 
loan amounts.12  As a result, aggressive originators sought to 
 
8. See generally, e.g., Brescia, supra note 5;; Julia Patterson Forrester, 
Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and 
Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303 (2006);; Christopher L. 
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007);; 
Schwartz, supra note 5.  These authors tend to limit the blame they assign to 
securitizers and investors to facilitation rather than active promotion of 
predatory lending practices, and thus do not analyze the manner in which 
WKHVHSDUWLHVEHQHILWHGIURPRULJLQDWRUV·DEXVLYHSUDFWLFHV 
9. See discussion infra Part I. 
10. , ZLOO XVH WKH WHUP ´VHFXULWL]HUVµ to refer to the various entities 
involved in purchasing mortgage loans from originators and selling securities 
backed by those loans to investors.  Securitizers include the following: (1) the 
financial institutions who purchase and pool the loans and issue securities, 
(2) the companies who rate the securities, (3) the companies who are enrolled 
to collect monthly payments from borrowers and transmit them to the 
appropriate parties, (4) the entities who review loan files for compliance with 
underwriting guidelines, and (5) the entities who maintain the numerous 
documents relating to the loans, mortgages, and agreements between the 
various parties. 
11. See infra notes 84-­86 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 84-­86 and accompanying text. 
3
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close many loans with large principal amounts and with terms 
that were expensive for the borrowers (and thus lucrative for 
securitizers and investors).  Because originators sold these 
loans within months or sometimes even days, they were not 
FRQFHUQHG ZLWK HQVXULQJ D ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ WKH
debt.13  Third, securitizers and investors³who did bear the risk 
of borrower defaults and thus could reasonably have been 
expected to perform adequate due diligence to ensure the long-­
term viability of loans they purchased³devised convoluted and 
unprecedented loan terms that, at least in the medium run, 
turned defaults from sources of loss to sources of massive 
profits.14  Indeed, mortgage loan unaffordability was central to 
WKHUDWHRIWKHPRUWJDJHPDUNHW·VJURZWKLQUHFHQW\HDUV, as it 
directly led to millions of refinances by borrowers who were 
unable to keep up with their rising mortgage payments,15 
ZKLFKLQWXUQXOWLPDWHO\OHGWRWKHPDUNHW·VFUDVK 
The mortgage industry did not always suffer from these 
infirmities.  Traditionally, mortgage loan originators, typically 
savings and loan associations, held the vast majority of loans 
they made in their portfolios until those loans were fully paid, 
often years after origination.16  This meant that lenders were 
committing substantial amounts of capital, for long periods of 
time, to each loan they made.  When a borrower defaulted on 
her loan, the originating lender bore the cost of collection and 
any resulting loss.  Consequently, lenders carefully scrutinized 
HYHU\ ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ D SURSRVHG ORDQ UHTXLUHG
substantial equity (a down payment in the case of a purchase 
money loan³the most common kind of mortgage loan at the 
time), and lent on terms that could reasonably be expected to 
be affordable to the borrower in the long run.17  Because the 
 
13. See infra notes 84-­86 and accompanying text. 
14. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2). 
15. Data provided through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 
´+0'$µ) § 302, 12 U.S.C. 2801 (2006), demonstrates that in 2004, a 
majoriW\RIQHZFRQYHQWLRQDOPRUWJDJH ORDQV LQFOXGLQJQHZ´KLJKHU-­SULFHGµ
loans, were refinanced loans rather than purchase money loans.  See 
generally, e.g., Lei Ding et al., Neighborhood Patterns of High-­Cost Lending: 
The Case of Atlanta, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 193 
(2008). 
16. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 2191-­94 (discussing the origins of the 
American mortgage industry). 
17. Id. 
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transaction was relatively simple, a borrower could easily 
compare various offers and make an educated decision about 
which available loan was the most favorable.  While the system 
was not perfect, lenders had a limited ability and desire to 
induce borrowers to take on more than they could afford.  
However, because lenders were investing their own capital, the 
number of loans they were able to make was constrained.18 
The limited availability of funds to lend to property owners 
made the costs of borrowing prohibitive for many would-­be 
homeowners.  Because each lender made relatively few loans 
and was particularly vulnerable to defaults, they were 
comparatively inefficient.  The recent widespread use of 
securitization has enabled individual lenders to close many 
more loans and streamline their procedures.19  Because many 
of these new mortgage lenders were not banks, they were not 
subject to capital reserve requirements and other regulations, 
which further impeded efficiency.20  In addition, there has been 
 
18. The Federal Government did ease this constraint to some extent by 
creating several entities, most notably the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae), see 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006), and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), see 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (2006), to 
SXUFKDVH DQG VHFXULWL]HPRUWJDJH ORDQV LQ RUGHU WR IUHHXS OHQGHUV· FDSLWDO
DQG DOORZ WKHP WR PDNH PRUH ORDQV  7KHVH FRPSDQLHV· DELOLW\ WR EX\
mortgages, however, paled in comparison to that of the investors worldwide 
who would later enter the market.  More importantly, as explained below, the 
government-­created entities carefully devised lending criteria for lenders 
whom they financed, requiring them to vet borrowers in a manner similar to 
that which they had traditionally used.  See discussion infra Part I(A). 
19. See *LRYDQQL'HOO·$ULFFLD'HQL],JDQ	/XF/DHYHQCredit Booms 
and Lending Standards: Evidence From the Subprime Mortgage Market 31 
(European Banking Ctr., Working Paper No. 2009-­14S, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100138 (follow 
´'RZQORDGµQRWLQJWKDWWKHYROXPHRIPRUWJDJHORDQRULJLQDWLRns covered by 
HMDA grew from $1.184 trillion in 2000 to $3.031 trillion in 2005);; Kiff & 
Mills, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that total mortgage originations were slightly 
greater than $500 billion in 1995, and reached more than $3.5 trillion in 
2003);; Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit 
Expansion: Evidence From the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis 9 (Dec. 12, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Social Science Research Network), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304 (IROORZ ´'RZQORDGµ ILQGLQJ
WKDW´>W@KHDQQXDOL]HGJURZWKUDWHRIRULJLQDWLRQVIRUKRPHSXUFKDVH>ZLWKLQ
the studied zip codes] jumps from 14.4% from 1996 to 2002 to 19.4% from 
 WR µ DQG QRWLQJ WKDW ´WKH DJJUHJDWH 86 PRUWJDJH PDUNHW LV
approximaWHO\WULOOLRQµ 
20. The National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 100 (1864) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), today, provides for numerous 
regulations of bank activities by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
5
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greater diversity among MBS investors than there was among 
savings and loans investors regarding their tolerance for risk.21  
Some investors were therefore willing to invest in riskier loans 
than banks had traditionally been willing to make and own.  
This opened up the availability of credit, to a large segment of 
the population, which had been considered intolerable credit 
risks and thus had been systematically shut out by traditional 
banks.22  These are the often professed virtues of 
securitization³more loans, at lower costs, extended to a wider 
range of people.  The perception of these benefits and the 
enormous profitability of securitizing subprime mortgage loans 
blinded many people, in particular lawmakers and regulators, 
WR WKH PDUNHW·V IODZV LQFOXGLQJ LWV FUHDWLRQ RI KDUPIXO
incentives to place millions of homeowners into unaffordable 
mortgage loans by almost any means. 
 
I. The Evolution of the Mortgage Lending Market 
 
Over the last century³particularly the last twenty years³
the mortgage lending industry has changed in ways that 
significantly modified the roles and responsibilities of the 
participating businesses.  Over time, mortgage lending has 
become more common as the result of the introduction of two 
participants: the Federal Government and private investors.  
As these market participants increased their involvement and 
influence, the role and responsibilities of the front-­line makers 
of loans (i.e., the originators) were vastly reduced, utterly 
transforming their incentives and behavior.  Law and policy 
have failed to keep pace with these drastic changes, and have 
 
(for national bank associations) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (for 
savings associations).  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 59 (2006) (prescribing the method 
by which a national bank may reduce its capital);; 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (2006) 
GLUHFWLQJ WKH2IILFH RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ WR LPSRVH ´FDSLWDO VWDQGDUGVµ RQ
savings associations). 
21. See Unterman, supra note 1, at 57, 61 (explaining that securitization 
HQDEOHG LQYHVWRUV WR ´VSHFLILFDOO\ WDLORU WKHLU GHVLUHG ULVN H[SRVXUHVµ DQG
GHVFULELQJWKHLQFUHPHQWDOL]DWLRQRIULVNWKURXJKWKHXVHRI´WUDQFKHVµ 
22. Racism was an important component of the refusal to lend to the 
supposedly non-­credit-­worthy.  See generally, e.g., Shelby D. Green, Disquiet 
RQWKH+RPH)URQW'LVWXUELQJ&ULVHVLQWKH1DWLRQ·V0DUNHWVDQG,QGXVWULHV, 
30 PACE L. REV. 7, 13 n.25 (2009).  This phenomenon³known as redlining³is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  See also infra note 93 and accompanying 
text. 
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left borrowers, investors, and financial markets vulnerable to 
gross distortions in traditional apportionment of risk.23 
 
A. 7KH7UDGLWLRQDO ´7ZR3DUW\µDQG´7KUHH3DUW\µ0RGHOVRI   
Mortgage Lending24 
 
Originating in the nineteenth century, the evolution of 
mortgage lending in the United States has been both 
complicated and haphazard.  A number of scholars have clearly 
and comprehensively described the particulars.25  For the 
purposes of this Article, the most salient characteristic of pre-­
New Deal mortgage lending was the source of lending capital.  
Lenders at that time did not have access to outside sources of 
financing and did not sell the loans they made;; thus they lent 
entirely from their own capital.26  The number of loans that a 
lender could make was therefore limited by the funds actually 
held by that lender.  In addition, because lenders continuously 
owned the mortgage loans they made, they bore the full risk of 
borrower default.  That risk compelled lenders to carefully 
DVVHVVHDFKERUURZHU·VDELOLW\WRUHSD\WKHORDQDQGWRGHFOLQH
to lend to anyone who posed even a minimal risk of default.27  
The careful assessment of risk was coupled with requirements 
that few people could satisfy, including significant equity ratios 
(normally forty percent) and short terms to maturity (usually 
one to five years).28  In addition, lenders were typically 
staunchly discriminatory and refused to lend to both racial 
minorities and women.29  2QO\ D VPDOO PLQRULW\ RI WRGD\·V
mortgage borrowers³affluent, white men³would have 
 
23. For a more thorough description of the various lending schemes 
discussed in this section, see Peterson, supra note 8, at 2191-­2213. 
24. ,KDYHDGRSWHG WKH WHUPV ´WZRSDUW\µDQG ´WKUHHSDUW\µ WRGHVFULEH
these lending models.  See id. at 2191-­97 (utilizing the terms). 
25. For a comprehensive account of the complexity of this evolution, see 
id. at 2191-­94. 
26. In most cases, that capital consisted mainly of deposits by members 
of the institutions, who were originally the only ones entitled to borrow those 
funds.  Insurance companies and individual property sellers also commonly 
made mortgage loans. 
27. See id. at 2191-­92. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 2192-­93. 
7
48 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30:41 
qualified for a loan under such circumstances.30  The pre-­New 
Deal mortgage industry was characterized by simple funding 
mechanisms, severely limited lending capital, and generally 
ardent lender caution.31 
The many Federal Government initiatives meant to 
stimulate stagnating industries during the Great Depression 
included efforts to shore up real estate sales and residential 
construction.32  Over the course of the Great Depression, more 
than half of all residential mortgage borrowers defaulted on 
their loans.33  This prompted a massive foreclosure stampede 
and subsequent devaluation of real estate, and consequently 
put an emphatic end to further mortgage lending.34  In order to 
recapitalize and reassure hard hit lenders, the Roosevelt 
administration purchased many of their non-­performing 
loans.35  This practice removed liabilities carrying significant 
uncertainty froP WKH OHQGHUV· ERRNV DQG VKRUHG XS WKHLU
depleted capital reserves.36  The government quickly followed 
these purchases with the creation of the Federal Housing 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ´)+$µ37 which insured privately-­made 
mortgage loans that met FHA-­established conditions and thus 
protected lenders from the risk of borrower defaults on such 
loans.38  The FHA-­imposed conditions promoted caution by 
establishing affordability measures.39  The FHA also promoted 
 
30. Id. 
31. As Professor Peterson points out, however, mortgage lenders began 
financing their operations through bonds secured by the mortgage loans they 
made in the 1880s.  Id. at 2193-­94.  This early experiment with securitized 
funding of the mortgage lending market collapsed in the 1890s.  Id. 
32. Id. at 2194-­97. 
33. Id. at 2194. 
34. Id. at 2194-­97. 
35. Id. at 2195-­96. 
36. This practice also enabled the Federal Government to refinance the 
troubled mortgages, thus allowing many borrowers to remain solvent and 
resume their economic participation.  One could argue that purchasing the 
´WURXEOH DVVHWVµ DV WKH\ PLJKW EH FDOOHG WRGD\ PD\ KDYH OHG WR D PRUDO
hazard and improvident lending practices.  As described in the following 
paragraphs, however, the other policies instituted on the heels of these 
purchases, constrained lender behavior in a manner that reduced such 
incentives. 
37. The National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (current 
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)). 
38. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 2195-­96. 
39. Id. 
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the extension of credit to a far broader array of borrowers by 
reducing, but not eliminating, the equity ratio requirements 
that had been traditionally imposed, and by extending loan 
maturities to a period up to thirty years, thereby spreading 
repayment over a much longer period of time and reducing the 
monthly repayment burden placed on borrowers.40  The most 
revolutionary development was the creation of the Federal 
National 0RUWJDJH $VVRFLDWLRQ )10$ RU ´)DQQLH 0DHµ
which was charged with purchasing qualifying mortgage loans 
from lenders, thus freeing them to make more new loans.41  
Instead of having their capital tied up in mortgage loans for 
thirty years, lenders could quickly sell qualifying loans to 
Fannie Mae (and later to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation³´)UHGGLH0DFµ42 and reuse that same capital to 
make more loans.43  Lenders could thus make far more 
mortgage loans than their capital would otherwise have 
allowed without bearing the risk of borrower default on those 
loans. 
An important constraint on mortgage originators was that 
mortgage loans had WRPHHW WKH*6(V· FULWHULD LQ RUGHU WR EH
sold.  By strictly enforcing their underwriting and other 
FULWHULD WKH *6(V ZHUH DEOH WR NHHS PRUWJDJH RULJLQDWRUV·
incentives nearly constant.  The considerations that had 
factored into the decision to lend beforH WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V
involvement, although generally somewhat relaxed by the 
*6(V· UHTXLUHPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ ERUURZHU LQFRPH DQG RWKHU
ILQDQFLDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV LQFOXGHG WKH SURSHUW\·V HTXLW\
UHVHUYHVDQG WKH ORDQ·V WHUPV 7KLV UHOD[DWLRQZDV FUXFLDO WR
maintaining the same originator practices, which had 
previously been driven entirely by their own large stake in 
each mortgage they made.  The fundamental change in the 
originator business model would have had the potential to 
drastically affect their behavior absent some countervailing 
pressure from the GSEs upon whom originators depended for 
 
40. Id. at 2196. 
41. Id. at 2197-­99.  See also supra note 18. 
42. See supra note 18. 
43. Peterson, supra note 8, at 2196.  The Federal Housing Association 
´)+$µ )DQQLH 0DH WKH *RYHUQPHQW 1DWLRQDO 0RUWJDJH $VVRFLDWLRQ
´*LQQLH 0DHµ ZKLFK ZDV )DQQLH 0DH·V VSLQ-­off), and Freddie Mac will 
hereinafter be referred to as the Government Sponsored Enterprises 
´*6(Vµ 
9
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revenue. 
 
B. The Private Securitization Model 
 
When private entities, mainly traditional banks and 
investment banks, began purchasing mortgage loans and 
issuing associated securities whose values were derived from 
MBS,44 WKH\ HVVHQWLDOO\ UHSOLFDWHG DQG DPSOLILHG WKH *6(V·
roles, but used different criteria for mortgage origination.  Over 
time, as the private label MBS market matured and stabilized, 
underwriting criteria were relaxed further in order to meet 
LQYHVWRUV· JURZLQJ GHPDQG IRU 0%645  By the height of the 
subprime mortgage boom, in the period 2004-­2006, it was 
common for securities to be based, at least in part, on mortgage 
loans with varying interest rates, varying payments (that were 
sometimes not based on interest rates), and non-­amortizing 
PRQWKO\ SD\PHQWV ZLWKRXW DQ\ GRFXPHQWDWLRQ RI ERUURZHUV·
LQFRPHV RU DVVHWV VRPHWLPHV GHVSLWH WKH ERUURZHUV· KDYLQJ
supplied extensive documentation to their loan officer who, for 
whatever reason, deemed it undesirable).46  The subprime 
loans made during this era differed from traditional mortgage 
loans in ways that made them far less viable over their thirty-­
year terms.  In addition, loan amounts were increasing at a 
rapid pace and home equity was vanishing despite rising 
property values.47  Thus, a great number of large loans were 
secured by newly created property values and owed by 
homeowners who were not nearly affluent enough to repay 
them. 
Securitizers and investors had ample information about 
 
44. MBS are special cases of asset-­EDFNHGVHFXULWLHV ´$%6µZhich can 
be backed by any number of assets, including other consumer debts, such as 
credit card receivables, automobile loans, and consumer merchandise loans. 
45. See Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at  VWDWLQJ WKDW ´>X@QWLO  WKH
PDMRULW\RIPRUWJDJHRULJLQDWLRQVZHUH ¶SULPHFRQIRUPLQJ· ORDQVµ WKDWFRXOG
EHSXUFKDVHGE\*6(VEXWWKDW´E\RYHUKDOIRIDOORULJLQDWLRQVGLGQRW
PHHW WKH*6(V· ¶FRQIRUPLQJ· FULWHULD,µ LQGLFDWLQJDSURJUHVVLYHGeterioration 
of standards from 2003 until 2006). 
46. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2). 
47. See, e.g., Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 3, at 28-­29 (arguing, 
in part, that rising loan-­to-­YDOXHUDWLRV´/79VµFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHVXESULPH
PRUWJDJHPDUNHW·VEXVWPHDQLQJ WKDW HTXLW\PXVWKDYHEHHQYDQLVKLQJDV
loan amounts were increasing).  See also infra note 70 (discussing LTVs). 
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the changes in lending standards and the glaring 
incompatibility of subprime mortgage loan terms with their 
ERUURZHUV·LQFRPHV48  But the securities backed by these loans 
were rated extremely safe and were far more profitable than 
comparable securities,49 so no efforts were made to curb the 
increasingly risky lending schemes.  In fact, the MBS market 
experienced massive expansion just as the soundness of 
subprime mortgage loans went from dubious to implausible.50  
By the time the market reached its peak³in terms of hundreds 
of billions of dollars of outstanding securities³its securities 
were based on mortgage loans so fantastically detached from 
WKHLUERUURZHUV·ILQDQFLDOPHDQVWKDWE\HDUO\WZR-­thirds 
of those securities were in default, and of those, the senior-­most 
third of these securities lost approximately 68% of their value, 
while the rest lost roughly 95% of their value.51 
 
II. Consensus Diagnosis: Failure by All Parties to 
Appropriately Assess Risk of Real Estate Downturn 
 
A number of scholars have studied the evolution of 
subprime mortgage loan securitization, forming limited 
consensus about some of its consequences but diverging about 
others.  The consensus³to the extent it exists³is that investor 
demand for MBS increased sharply during the last several 
\HDUV RI WKH PDUNHW·V ERRP OHDGLQJ WR WKH VLJQLILFDQW
deterioration of lending standards, which in turn resulted in a 
greater-­than-­tolerable percentage of unsustainable mortgage 
loans.52  There is also near consensus that this overreach 
 
48. Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 3, at 32. 
49. See, e.g., Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating 
Agencies Failed America and What Can Be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. 
L. REV. 1275, 1289-­90 (2009) (describing the unusually high rate of default for 
modern collateralized debt obligations of a certain rating, as compared with 
corporate bonds receiving the same rating in the ten previous years). 
50. See Kiff & Mills, supra QRWHDW H[SODLQLQJ WKDW ´SULYDWH ODEHOµ
securitization increased sharply between 2002 and 2006). 
51. See Gillian Tett, Time is Nigh to Put the True Value of CDOs Out in 
the Open, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 27, 2009, at 22. 
52. See, e.g. 'HOO·$ULFFLD ,JDQ	/DHYHQ supra note 19, at 3 (finding 
ZLGHVSUHDG ´GHFOLQH LQ OHQGLQJ VWDQGDUGVµ DQG D FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH
extent of the deterioration and prevalence of subprime mortgage loans and 
securitization of loans);; Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 6-­7 (noting the shift 
IURP´SULPHFRQIRUPLQJµORDQVSXUFKDVHGE\WKH*6(VZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHGWKH
11
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RFFXUUHG SULPDULO\ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR ´VXESULPHµ PRUWJDJH
loans.53  One implication of these conclusions is that subprime 
mortgage loan securitization directly contributed to the 
PDUNHW·V HYHQWXDO FROODSVH  +RZHYHU WKHUH LV ZLGHVSUHDG
disagreement regarding the causes that led to the wholesale 
GLVUHJDUGRIVXESULPH0%6·VLQILUPLWLHV 
As indicated above, various authors have suggested the 
following³mostly compatible³explanations for the current 
crisis: (1) the failure of credit rating agencies to honestly 
disclose the credit risks associated with the securities they 
rated,54 (2) the unrealistic optimism of mortgage borrowers 
regarding their financial means,55 (3) the inadequacy of 
traditional individual credit score ratings for the purpose of 
mortgage lending,56 (4) the complexity of the financial 
instruments which led to unintentional risk-­taking by 
investors,57 (5) the failure of financial regulators to limit the 
rapid rate of financial innovation,58 and (6) the sheer incaution 
of investors.59  While several authors acknowledge that 
predatory lending practices may have led to the making of bad 
loans, none examine the extent to which this happened, the 
 
´PDMRULW\µ RI PRUWJDJH ORDQV SULRU WR  WR VHFXULWL]HG VXESULPH ORDQV
ZKLFKGLGQRWPHHWWKH*6(V·FULWHULDDVZHOODV´VWURQJLQYHVWRUDSSHWLWHIRU
higher-­yielding securities in 2005-­06 [which] probably contributed to looser 
XQGHUZULWLQJVWDQGDUGVµ 
53. See 'HOO·$ULFFLD,JDQ	/DHYHQ supra note 19, at 2-­3;; Kiff & Mills, 
supra note 3, at 6-­7. 
54. See generally, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM·N, supra note 
2;; Bruner, supra note 2;; Reiss, supra note 2. 
55. See, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra QRWHDWQRWLQJWKDW´ERUURZHUVZHUH
ILQDQFLDOO\RYHUVWUHWFKLQJYLD ULVN\ ¶DIIRUGDELOLW\SURGXFWV·µ DQG FRQFOXGLQJ
ZLWKRXW H[SODQDWLRQ WKDW ´PDQ\ >ERUURZHUV@ DSSDUHQWO\ O>LHG@ DERXW WKHLU
ILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVWRJHWORDQVµ 
56. See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax 
Screening?  Evidence From Subprime Loans (Dec. 25, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Social Science Research Network), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093137) (follow 
´'RZQORDGµ H[SODLQLQJ WKDW OHQGHUV WHQGHG WR SHUIRUP OHVV VFUHHQLQJ RI
borrowers with higher credit scores, resulting in more reckless lending to 
higher-­rated borrowers, and thus undermining the correlation between high 
borrower credit score and ability to repay the particular loan). 
57. See generally, e.g., Gerding, supra note 4;; Schwarcz, supra note 1;; 
Unterman, supra note 1. 
58. See generally, e.g., Brescia, supra note 5;; Di Lorenzo, supra note 5;; 
Gerding, supra note 4;; Schwarcz, supra note 1;; Unterman, supra note 1;; 
Schwartz, supra note 5. 
59. See generally, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3. 
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ways in which it may have been facilitated, or the potential it 
had to distort the MBS market.60 
One especially noteworthy account holds that the 
securitization of mortgage loans protected investors from the 
ULVN RI RULJLQDWRUV· EDQNUXSWF\ DQG LQ WKH SURFHVV, distorted 
the incentives of market participants in a manner that 
encouraged excessive risk-­taking.61  In particular, this account 
finds that investors who did not bear the risk of mortgage 
RULJLQDWRUV· LQVROYHQF\ KDG OLWWOH UHDVRQ WR VFUXWLQL]H WKH
business practices of originators to ensure their 
sustainability.62  Had the mortgage loans backing the MBS 
remained within the reach of the bankruptcy estates of 
PRUWJDJH RULJLQDWRUV WKHQ LQYHVWRUV ZKRVH VHFXULWLHV· YDOXHV
were based on those mortgage loans would have had 
considerable incentives to invest in mortgages unlikely to be 
caught up in bankruptcy proceedings.63  But because that 
possibility was drastically reduced by the securitization 
mechanisms devised by modern securities issuers, this 
SDUWLFXODU ´EDQNUXSWF\ WD[µ ZDV HOLPLQDWHG64  As a result, 
 
60. A number of scholars, most notably Christopher Peterson, have 
shown connections between securitization and predatory lending.  See 
generally Peterson, supra note 8.  These efforts, however, have largely been 
confined to the behavior of mortgage originators and have not closely 
examined the incentives of other market participants that may have fueled 
the destructive origination practices or the effect that these practices could 
have on the market at large.  See generally Brescia, supra note 5;; Di Lorenzo, 
supra note 5;; Forrester, supra note 8;; Peterson, supra note 8;; Allison De Tal, 
Comment, Knowledge is Power: Consumer Education and the Subprime 
Mortgage Market, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 633 (2008);; Schwartz, supra note 5. 
61. See generally, e.g., Unterman, supra note 1 (explaining that the 
bankruptcy remoteness of mortgage lenders led their creditors to disregard 
the risky nature of their conduct). 
62. Id. at 79-­80 (noting that financial institutions that financed 
subprime lenders were aware of, and disregarded, WKHOHQGHUV·ULVN\OHQGLQJ
practices). 
63. ,QGHHGWKHIDLOXUHRIPRUWJDJHRULJLQDWRUVFRQWULEXWHGWRWKH·V
crash of the mortgage-­backed bond market.  See Peterson, supra note 8, at 
2193-­94. 
64. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The 
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1564-­
  GLVFXVVLQJ WKH ´EDQNUXSWF\ WD[µ  $ VHSDUDWH DQG IDU OHVV
significant bankruptcy tax was created instead.  Namely, investors still bore 
WKH ULVN WKDW WKH 6SHFLDO 3XUSRVH 9HKLFOHV ´639Vµ FUHDWHG WR RZQ WKH
mortgage loans, see Unterman, supra note 1, at 59, would themselves become 
bankrupt.  But because those SPVs did literally nothing other than own 
loans, they were far less likely to become bankrupt for any reason other than 
13
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subprime mortgage originators were free to engage in many 
types of highly risky behaviors without suffering any losses in 
business from investors, via the securitizers, who ultimately 
funded their businesses.65  The identification of such a shift in 
incentives, which went unmatched by a corresponding shift in 
regulation or policy, alerts us to an opportunity to correct the 
regulatory and policy failure. 
The works of the various authors who have addressed the 
mortgage market bust are, to varying degrees, persuasive 
explanations RI VRPHRI WKH FDXVHV RI WKHPDUNHW·VPHOWGRZQ
Some of these causes were probably fatal on their own.  This 
paper is consistent with the various explanations that have 
been offered, but seeks to add another that has received 
insufficient consideration³that is, another single-­handedly 
fatal cause of the crisis had to do with the manner in which the 
lending industry interacted with the borrowers whose 
PRUWJDJHSD\PHQWVXOWLPDWHO\XQGHUSLQQHGWKH0%6·VYDOXHV
The fraudulent and abusive tactics that were often employed to 
enroll homeowners into mortgage loans were intimately 
connected to the features of subprime loans that made them 
both highly profitable for securitizers and investors in the 
short-­run and unsustainable in the long-­run. 
 
III. Changes in the Mortgage Lending Industry Caused a 
Seismic Shift in Incentives that Law and Policy Failed to 
Acknowledge 
 
The progression from two party and three party mortgage 
transactions that dominated the twentieth century, to the 
many-­party transactions that were emblematic of subprime 
mortgage lending during the 1990s and 2000s, fundamentally 
transformed the behavior of market participants.  In order to 
focus on the most consequential of these changes, securities 
 
WKH ORDQV·RZQ IDLOXUHV WRSHUIRUP LQZKLFKFDVH WKH LQvestors would suffer 
losses anyhow.  See id. at 59-­60. 
65. The one kind of risk that this did not excuse originators from taking 
had to do with making risky loans.  The disposal of that kind of risk is the 
subject of this paper.  The risks disposed of by the elimination of the 
bankruptcy tax included the risks posed by (1) under-­capitalization, (2) illegal 
activity subjecting the company to liability, (3) poor business judgment and 
management, and ( EXVLQHVV GRZQWXUQV DQG RWKHU ´QDWXUDOµ ORVVHV RI
revenue. 
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issuers and sellers, trusts and trustees, depositors, document 
custodians, and servicers will often be treated collectively as 
´VHFXULWL]HUVµ DOWKRXJK LW ZLOO VRPHWLPHV EH QHFHVVDU\ WR
distinguish between these various parties.  Similarly, mortgage 
originators and brokers will often be treated collectively as 
´RULJLQDWRUVµ  %RUURZHUV DQG 0%6 LQYHVWRUV· EHKDYLRUV ZLOO
also be examined.66 
 
A. Mortgage Originators 
 
One aspect of mortgage lending that has not changed much 
RYHU WKH\HDUV LVZKDWPD\EHFDOOHG WKH ´IURQW-­HQGµQDPHO\, 
the originators who are the ERUURZHUV·RQO\FRQWDFWVZLWKLQWKH
vast mortgage lending industry.67  As discussed above,68 when 
an originator makes a loan that it will hold in its portfolio, the 
WUDQVDFWLRQ LV HLWKHU D ´WZR SDUW\µ RU D ´WKUHH SDUW\µ
transaction.69  In a two party transaction, the originator will 
lend its own capital and will EHDUWKHIXOOULVNRIWKHERUURZHU·V
possible default.  Defaults can be very expensive for a mortgage 
loan holder because curing the default can involve numerous 
collection efforts and other communications with the borrower, 
extensive analysis of her new financial situation, reappraisal of 
WKH SURSHUW\·V YDOXH DQG DQ DQDO\VLV RI WKHPRUWJDJHH·V RZQ
financial condition in order to determine which course of action 
is warranted.  Possible resolutions include renegotiation of the 
 
66. &RQIXVLQJO\RULJLQDWRUVDQGVHUYLFHUVRIWHQXVHWKHWHUP´LQYHVWRUµ
to refer to some or all of the members of the group of entities that I have 
ODEHOHG ´VHFXULWL]HUVµ HVSHFLDOO\ WUXVWHHV  5HFDOO WKDW LW LV WKH WUXVWHH RQ
behalf of the trust, that has legal ownership of the mortgage loans and 
therefore, absent collateral agreements assigning its rights elsewhere, has 
control over thHKDQGOLQJRI WKH WUXVW·V ORDQV LQFOXGLQJ WKHLU HQIRUFHPHQWs, 
sales, and modifications. 
67. Sometimes, especially recently, a borrower would interact principally 
(or even solely) with a mortgage broker, who in theory was charged with 
helping the borrower find a loan particularly suited to his or her situation.  
Brokers often also act on behalf of lenders.  They can be compensated by both 
the borrower and the lender for bringing the parties together.  Borrowers 
often do not understand the dual nature of the mortgage broker and assume 
WKDW WKH EURNHU·V OR\DOWLHV OLH RQO\ZLWK WKHP +RZHYHU IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI
this discussion, I will assume that borrowers interact directly with 
originators (as is often the case) because originators and brokers have very 
similar incentives and usually treat borrowers similarly. 
68. See discussion supra Part I. 
69. See discussion supra Part I. 
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ORDQ·VWHUPVIRUEHDULQJIURPFROOHFWLQJRQWKHORDQIRUDSHULRG
of time in order to allow the borrower to recover from her 
troubles, or foreclosing on the loan and seizing the property, 
which may not recover the entire amount owed and may lead to 
litigation even in non-­judicial foreclosure jurisdictions.  All of 
these courses of actions are costly.  The originator who holds a 
loan in portfolio, therefore, has a strong incentive to ensure³at 
the time of the ORDQ·VLQFHSWLRQ³that the borrower will be able 
to fully repay the loan and that there is sufficient equity or 
collateral in the property to protect it if the borrower does 
default and the property is liquidated in foreclosure or in an 
open market sale.70 
There are two main precautions taken by a two party 
PRUWJDJHOHQGHUWRHQVXUHDERUURZHU·VDELOLW\WRUHSD\)LUVW
VXFKDOHQGHULVOLNHO\WRVHHNWRPDNHWKHERUURZHU·VPRQWKO\
mortgage payments predictable and consistent.  If the amount 
of future payments is capable of changing, especially in a 
manner unknown at the time of origination, it is difficult to 
ensure that the loan will always be affordable.  A lender could 
structure a loan so that payments will be constant for a long 
enough period of time so that when the payment amount does 
change, there will be ample equity in the property to cover the 
remaining debt.71  However, even such a loan poses a risk 
because collecting on a defaulted loan may be costly even if the 
full amount of the debt is fully secured by a comparatively high 
property value.  As a result, the vast majority of loans that 
were made prior to the private label securitization era had 
fixed interest rates and were fully amortizing (meaning that no 
debt would remain after the final monthly payment was 
made).72  This maximized the predictability of future payment 
amounts.73  Second, the monthly mortgage payments must not 
 
70. The measure of equity compared to the mortgage amount is called 
the loan-­to-­YDOXH UDWLR ´/79µ  /79 OLPLWV ZHUH FRPPRQO\ VL[W\ SHUFHQW
before the 1930s, and eighty percent for GSE-­insured or purchased loans.  See 
infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
71. A simple version of such a loan is one that has a balloon payment at 
maturity³i.e., a loan that is not fully amortizing. 
72. See discussion supra Part I(A). 
73. The possibility of changing payment amounts was not fully 
eliminated by fixed-­interest, fully-­amortizing loans because reinstating a 
defaulted loan by, IRU H[DPSOH UHQHJRWLDWLQJ WKH ORDQ·V WHUPV RU E\
UHFDSLWDOL]LQJ WKHDUUHDUV FRXOG FDXVH WKH ORDQ·VSULQFLSDO LQWHUHVW UDWHRU
maturity date to change and thus affect the payment amounts. 
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VWUDLQWKHERUURZHU·VEXGJHWVRVHYHUHO\DVWRSRVHDULVNWKDW
she will default on the loan.  The lender therefore examines the 
ERUURZHU·VGHEW-­to-­LQFRPHUDWLR ´',5µDQGHQGHDYRUVWRNHHS
that ratio below a certain percentage, which may vary 
GHSHQGLQJRQWKHOHQGHU·VWROHUDQFHRIULVN%HFDXVHWZRSDUW\
lenders tend to be risk-­averse, in light of the costs of borrower 
defaults, the DIR is likely to be low enough to prevent default 
in the case of short-­term, unexpected losses of income or 
increases in expenses.  The acceptable DIR may vary from 
lender to lender and even from borrower to borrower. 
These lender precautions are not meant to benefit 
borrowers.  Rather, they are meant to protect mortgagees³
who, in two party mortgage transactions, are also the 
originators of the mortgages³from the potentially high costs of 
default by borrowers.74  Payment stability and affordability, 
while usually desirable for borrowers, are crucial for risk-­
averse lenders engaging in two party mortgage transactions.  
But they do leave some room for lenders to take advantage of 
unsophisticated borrowers who might have obtained better 
terms if they had been more aware of both their own financial 
PHDQV DQG WKH OHQGHUV· FULWHULD  7KXV D OHQGHU ZKR
determines that a particular DIR is appropriate for a particular 
ORDQPD\ZHOOPDNHWKHERUURZHU·VPRQWKO\SD\PHQWVDVKLJK
as possible without exceeding that DIR, even though lower 
payments would still have been profitable.  However, it is 
usually extremely undesirable for a lender in such a 
transaction to place the borrower in a situation that risks 
leading to default.  Therefore, while the loan may not be 
optimal, it will usually not be catastrophically expensive either. 
 
 
74. Since these measures, implemented by mortgage loan originators, 
are meant to protect those originators from default on loans the originators 
hold in portfolio, one expects such measures to be absent where the 
originators do not intend to hold the mortgage loans.  Indeed, this is the case.  
See Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, Originate-­to-­Distribute Model and the Sub-­
Prime Mortgage Crisis 29 (Sept. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Social Science Research Network), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1167786 (follow 
´'RZQORDGµ FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW WKH ´RULJLQDWH-­to-­GLVWULEXWHPRGHOµZKHUHLQ D
OHQGHU LQWHQGV WR VHOO RU ´GLVWULEXWHµ WKH ORDQs it originates, lowers the 
quality of the loans originated by those lenders, and that the reduction in 
TXDOLW\LVFDXVHGE\WKH´ODFNRIVFUHHQLQJLQFHQWLYHFUHDWHGE\WKHVHSDUDWLRQ
RIRULJLQDWLRQIURPWKHXOWLPDWHEHDUHURIWKHGHIDXOWULVNµ 
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 1. Federal Government Maintained Originator Incentives 
in Place 
 
7KH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH PRUWJDJH
market had the potential to drastically change mortgage 
RULJLQDWRUV· LQFHQWLYHV DQG EHKDYLRUV  $IWHU DOO LI WKH
government was going to insure an originator against losses or 
buy its loans outright, it did not really matter anymore 
whether borrowers defaulted on their mortgage loans.  
However, the GSEs instituted strict underwriting guidelines 
that limited the kinds of mortgages eligible for insurance or 
purchase, thereby constraining originators who wished to 
benefit from these programs.75  The government essentially 
VRXJKW WR SUHVHUYH RULJLQDWRUV· LQFHQWLYHV WR HQVXUH ERUURZHU
affordability and guard against loss through the imposition of 
',5 /79 DQG RWKHU UHTXLUHPHQWV  7KH JRYHUQPHQW·V
initiatives were meant to promote homeownership among those 
who had traditionally not had access to mortgage loans because 
WKH\ FRXOG QRW PHHW OHQGHUV· VWULFW UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG they 
therefore relaxed some of the more stringent criteria.76  For 
example, the LTV limit was raised to eighty percent, from what 
had typically been sixty percent, in order to allow purchasers to 
make smaller down payments.77  Mortgage terms were also 
extended from five years or less to periods of up to thirty years, 
thus reducing the amount of monthly mortgage payments 
needed to pay off the loans by their maturity dates and 
enabling more borrowers to meet the DIR requirements.78  
These policies were intended to expand the middle class.79  
Thus, in order to exclude affluent borrowers who could obtain 
credit without government assistance, the GSE programs also 
capped the principal amount and thereby excluded expensive 
homes.  The GSEs also dealt exclusively with certain 
government-­supervised originators, excluding many of the 
more aggressive and unstable originators that would appear 
RYHUWKHFRXUVHRIWKHPDUNHW·VERRP 
 
75. Peterson, supra note 8, at 2172.  See also Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, 
at 3-­7. 
76. Peterson, supra note 8, at 2195-­98. 
77. See id. at 2195-­96;; supra note 70. 
78. Peterson, supra note 8, at 2196. 
79. See id. 
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The market for MBS, including those backed by mortgage 
loans ineligible for GSE insurance or purchase, emerged when 
investment banks began purchasing, pooling and securitizing 
loans, much like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been doing 
with certain conventional loans.80  Lenders justified the 
imposition of less favorable terms, namely higher interest rates 
and closing costs, by pointing to the greater risk of default 
posed by unconventional loans,81 which in turn rendered the 
associated securities potentially more profitable.  Many of 
WKHVH ERUURZHUV ZHUH FDOOHG ´VXESULPHµ D UHIHUHQFH WR WKH
credit risk they supposedly posed.82  As the market expanded 
throughout the 1990s and this past decade, many new 
originators appeared and existing originators shifted their 
emphasis to meet and stoke the growing demand. 
Subprime mortgage loan originators increasingly made 
loans with the intention of selling them quickly into the 
secondary market, and thus needed comparatively little capital 
WRVXSSRUWODUJHQXPEHUVRIORDQRULJLQDWLRQV2ULJLQDWRUV·GH-­
emphasis of portfolio lending led to a corresponding and 
predictable de-­emphasis of careful underwriting.  Because they 
would no longer bear the long-­term (or sometimes even short-­
term) risk of borrower default, originators became unconcerned 
ZLWKHQVXULQJ WKHLU ORDQV· YLDELOLW\  ,QVWHDGRULJLQDWRUV·QHZ
concern was ensuring that there would be a secondary market 
purchaser for each loan.  This gave the investment banks that 
pooled and securitized the mortgage loans great leverage over 
originators, enabling them to dictate the loan characteristics 
that they wanted originators to market to borrowers.  It also 
allowed investment banks, like the GSEs before them, to 
demand assurances that the loans were sound.  This was 
usually done by imposing certain underwriting criteria and by 
requiring originators to repurchase loans that defaulted within 
 
80. See, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 6-­10. 
81. After all, the government (and government-­created) entities refused 
to insure or purchase these loans precisely because they did not meet their 
criteria for soundness.  In addition to this implication of risk, the lack of 
government-­backing for the loans itself shifted the risk of borrower default 
onto mortgagees and investors. 
82. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 287 (quoting Mortgage Market Turmoil: 
Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Roger T. Cole, 
Director, Federal Reserve, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation)). 
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a certain, usually very short, period of time.83  Ultimately, the 
banks were poised to dictate both the precise loan terms that 
originators should offer to borrowers with certain profiles and 
WKH VWHSV WKDW RULJLQDWRUV VKRXOG WDNH WR YHULI\ ERUURZHUV·
financial means.  Many originators sought only to meet the 
EDQNV· FULWHULa, which diminished considerably over time, and 
made no additional efforts to evaluate the viability of the 
mortgage loans they made.  Thus, a crucial and longstanding 
check on reckless lending was eviscerated. 
Even more damaging than the loss of originatoUV·
LQFHQWLYHV WR ULJRURXVO\ VFUXWLQL]H WKHLU FXVWRPHUV· ILQDQFLDO
PHDQVZDVWKHSUHVVXUHWRRULJLQDWHRU´FKXUQµ84 loans at as 
high a rate as possible.  Because originators no longer held 
many of the loans that they made for more than a few months, 
they no longer derived much revenue from interest payments 
on those loans.  Instead, originators became almost entirely 
dependent upon the upfront fees they charged borrowers and 
any compensation they received from the secondary market 
purchasers of loans.  Originators therefore profited most from 
closing as many loans as possible and doing so efficiently, i.e., 
as quickly as possible, which made them all too happy to oblige 
WKH VHFRQGDU\ PDUNHW·V YRUDFLRXV GHPDQG IRU HYHU JUHDWHU
numbers of loans.  Rather than spend the time and resources to 
carefully vet each borrower, many originators sought to simply 
induce borrowers to accept offers as quickly and effortlessly as 
possible.  It was not long before fraudulent practices became 
rampant in the mortgage origination industry.85  It no longer 
mattered whether a borrower could afford to repay the loan 
RIIHUHGRUZKHWKHUWKHERUURZHU·VSURSHUW\ZDVZRUWKHQRXJK
to support the amount of the debt.  Unscrupulous originators 
thus began misrepresenting the cost of repayment to 
borrowers, eliciting fraudulent appraisals to justify ever larger 
mortgages, and sometimes even masking immediate defaults 
by borrowers by falsifying loan files they sold on the secondary 
 
83. Common underwriting criteria included LTR ratio, debt-­to-­income 
ratio, credit score, and other information rHODWLQJWRWKHERUURZHU·VDELOLW\WR
repay the loan. 
84. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, 
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
503, 546 (2002). 
85. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2). 
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market.86 
 
2.  Loss of Government Influence and the Emergence of 
 Deceptive Origination Practices 
 
By offering complicated and unusual loan products with 
shifting interest rates, shifting payment amounts, and less 
than fully-­amortizing payments, ambitious mortgage 
originators were able to convince unsophisticated borrowers to 
accept excessively costly and ultimately harmful mortgage 
loans.  These unusual and complex loans were euphemistically 
FDOOHG ´DIIRUGDELOLW\ SURGXFWVµ E\ WKH PRUWJDJH LQGXVWU\
because they created, for a short time, an appearance of 
affordability by putting off the true cost of the loans until later 
in the term.87  $GMXVWDEOH 5DWH 0RUWJDJHV ´$50Vµ EHFDPH
increasingly common in the subprime mortgage industry as the 
market for subprime MBSs expanded.  One reason is that 
many ARMs had ´WHDVHU ratesµ RU LQLWLDO LQWHUHVW UDWHV WKDW
were low and fixed for a short period of time (commonly 
somewhere between six months and five years), and which then 
changed at regular intervals over the remainder of the loan 
term according to a formula based on a common interest rate 
index plus a fixed margin.  Teaser rates were much lower than 
the projected fully-­indexed rates, meaning that ARMs with this 
feature were expected to experience significant increases in 
required monthly payments after the teaser period, even if 
prevailing interest rates did not change.  These loans are often 
referred to DV´µ´µ´µDQGVRRQ, according to the 
number of years during which the teaser rate lasts and the 
number of years during which the interest rate will be based on 
the formula.  An inexperienced borrower could easily be led by 
a determined broker or loan officer to believe that the 
SD\PHQWVGXHGXULQJ WKH ´IL[HGµ WHDVHU SHULRGZRXOG DFWXDOO\
be the same payment amounts that would always be due 
throughout the course of the loan. 
In addition to deceptively manipulating interest rates, 
 
86. See, e.g., Two Former Principals of Olympia Mortgage Indicted on 
Conspiracy, Wire Fraud, and Bank Fraud Charges, REUTERS, May 8, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS246343+08-­May-­
2008+PRN20080508. 
87. See, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 7. 
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lenders also began creatively manipulating the amortization of 
their loans.  This process began with the introduction of 
interest-­only and balloon mortgage loans.  The monthly 
payments made by borrowers with these kinds of loans were 
QRW VXIILFLHQW WR IXOO\ UHSD\ WKH GHEW E\ WKH ORDQ·V PDWXULW\
date, and therefore a balloon payment would be due at that 
date.88  Some loans had interest-­only periods that did not last 
the entire term of the loan;; these loans often had five-­ or ten-­
year interest-­only periods, after which they became fully 
amortizing.  The combination of opaque and deceptive interest 
rate manipulations with unusual amortization schedules made 
it exceedingly difficult for borrowers to determine what their 
payments would be and just what principal those payments 
would actually go towards paying off.  This consequently 
IDFLOLWDWHG RULJLQDWRUV· PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV WR ERUURZHUV DERXW
the cost of their loans, thus enabling the originators to induce 
borrowers to accept loans that seemed far more affordable than 
they truly were. 
The true cost of many subprime mortgage loans did not 
usually affect borrowers until one or two years after 
origination.  A borrower nearing or just reaching payment 
shock was likely to be contacted by a number of mortgage 
brokers and lenders, often including the one who had provided 
WKH ORDQ RIIHULQJ WR ORZHU WKH ERUURZHU·V SD\PHQWV E\
refinancing the loan.  By offering yet another convoluted loan 
product, tKH QHZ ORDQ ZRXOG OLNHO\ ORZHU WKDW ERUURZHU·V
monthly payments for a short while, taking the borrower 
through the very same ordeal all over again.  At this point, 
another feature of many subprime loans³the prepayment 
penalty³takes effect.  Many subprime loans require a 
borrower who pre-­pays his or her loan within a certain amount 
of time of origination³usually six months to three years³to 
pay a penalty.  A borrower who refinanced out of a subprime 
loan with a prepayment penalty at the end of the teaser period 
was likely to be charged a penalty for doing so.  Thus, by 
 
88. An interest-­only loan is a special type of balloon loan in which the 
monthly payments are in the exact amount of the interest generated each 
month.  At the time of maturity, the principal balance is thus exactly the 
same as it was at origination (i.e., these loans are non-­amortizing).  Other 
balloon mortgages typically have principal balances at maturity that are 
slightly less than the original amount (i.e., these loans are amortizing, but 
not fully amortizing). 
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flipping borrowers from loan to loan, originators and brokers 
were able to charge significant fees and penalties several times 
to each borrower.  This, of course, had the effect of depleting 
laUJH DPRXQWV RI ERUURZHUV· HTXLW\ ZLWKRXW SURYLGLQJ WKHP
much, if any, benefit.  Eventually, mixtures of the kinds of 
exotic terms discussed in this section were devised to ensure 
the continuation of the cycle of default and refinance with 
calculated precision and predictability, thus enabling lenders to 
decide when they would force a particular borrower to take her 
next loan. 
By the time a subprime mortgage borrower experienced 
payment shock, the loan had often long been sold and 
securitized and the originator was only involved as the 
servicer, if at all.  The originator could therefore credibly claim 
to no longer have the authority to help the borrower.  Even 
worse, numerous subprime originators were mere fly-­by-­night 
shells³requiring very little capital to operate their 
businesses³who had shut down by the time many of their 
borrowers ran into trouble.  This left those borrowers to try to 
explain their predicament to a servicer operating as the front 
for a group of entities with a convoluted set of interests in that 
loan, all of whom claimed to have had nothing to do with the 
RULJLQDWRU·VSUDFWLFHV DQGwere unable to rectify the resulting 
problems.  Borrowers who found themselves in this situation 
were made to feel like the only options available to them were 
to either sell their homes or try their luck with one of the many 
new loans being peddled to them. 
Lenders mastered the practice of obfuscation and deception 
ZKHQWKH\GHYHORSHG WKH3D\PHQW2SWLRQ$50 ´32$50µ89  
A POARM typically has an extremely low teaser rate lasting no 
more than a few months, during which time the borrower 
makes fully amortizing payments.  As a consequence of the 
near-­zero teaser rate, the payment amount is quite small.  
That payment amount is then locked in before the interest rate 
 
89. Many POARMs were marketed as Alt-­A loans, rather than subprime 
loans, and were thus intended to be safer investments.  While it is true that 
POARM interest rates were generally capped slightly lower than those of 
other subprime loans, their terms were so confusing and risky, especially 
because they were aggressively marketed to seniors and other borrowers with 
limited and fixed incomes who were incapable of withstanding the certain 
payment shock, that they presented at least as high a risk of default as any 
subprime loan product. 
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changes, often to four or five times the initial rate, after its 
brief teaser period.  As a result, the monthly payments do not 
suffice to even pay the interest that accrues each month, thus 
producing negative amortization.  However, an inexperienced 
borrower who assumes that her monthly payments bear some 
relation to her interest rate will not realize that this has 
happened, and will therefore assume that she has an affordable 
loan.  This situation cannot, of course, last for thirty years.  
Therefore, the amount that the principal can reach is capped 
by the terms of the loan to some percentage of the original 
amount, usually either 110% or 125%.  When the negatively 
amortizing principal reaches that cap, the borrower is required 
to make fully amortizing payments, which can be in an amount 
several times that of the prior monthly payments, all but 
ensuring default.90  POARMs typically have long and severe 
pre-­payment penalties, which increase over time because they 
are based on the outstanding principal balance.  They are often 
projected to remain in effect when the loan becomes fully 
amortizing, thus adding significantly to the cost of paying off 
the loan.  This product truly perfected the practice of trapping 
a mortgagor into an inscrutable loan and then bleeding her of a 
tremendous amount of her home·s equity. 
Because the fees generated by a loan are largely based on 
the amount borrowed,91 originators have an incentive to lend 
the largest amount possible.  To that end, originators pressured 
borrowers to consolidate all of their debts, including unsecured 
debts, into their mortgages.  For the same reason, originators 
also encouraged borrowers to take some cash³perhaps to 
make much needed home repairs, pay off utility and other bills, 
or to just take that much deserved vacation.92  Similarly, 
 
90. The payment shock is exacerbated by the increased principal and, at 
this point, the now slightly reduced time left until maturity. 
91. 7KLV LV ODUJHO\ GXH WR FHUWDLQ FRQVXPHU SURWHFWLRQ ODZV·
discouragement of fees in excess of a certain percentage of the loan amount.  
See, e.g., Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 ´+2(3$µ, 
Pub. L. 103-­325 § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at and amending scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (imposing various additional disclosure requirements in 
connection with loans whose interest rates exceed certain baselines). 
92. Including a cash component has two additional benefits: (1) it allows 
a lender to tarnish the credibility of the borrower who later sues it by 
SRLQWLQJWRWKHERUURZHU·VJUHHG\GHSOHWLRQRIKLVRUKHURZQKRPHHTXLW\DQG
WR WKXV SURYLGH DQ DOWHUQDWH H[SODQDWLRQ IRU WKH ERUURZHU·V ´FKRLFHµ RI WKH
SDUWLFXODU ORDQ DQG  LW HQVXUHV WKH ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WRPDNHPRUWgage 
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originators were compensated by the secondary market 
purchasers for imposing an interest rate greater than that for 
which the borrower had qualified.  The result was that 
originators had incentives to originate mortgage loans that 
were large and which had high interest rates for borrowers who 
were considered to have questionable abilities to repay. 
An obvious limitation of the expansion of the subprime 
market was the shortage of people who could be characterized 
as reasonably capable of repaying expensive and large 
subprime mortgage loans and who did not already have access 
to prime lending.  This was primarily dealt with in two ways.  
First, traditional lenders had largely refused to lend in 
minority communities, leaving a considerable portion of the 
population with little access to credit.  This phenomenon was 
known as redlining.93  The large and relatively inexperienced 
group of minority potential borrowers was aggressively 
pursued by subprime mortgage originators.  The extent and 
egregiousness of predatory practices targeted at members of 
minority communities, regardless of income or other credit risk 
factors, strongly suggests that subprime mortgage loans were 
foisted upon anyone who could be persuaded to take them, 
regardless of whether those borrowers were qualified for better 
loans.94  Second, as investor demand for MBS grew, 
XQGHUZULWLQJ FULWHULD DQG VHFXULWL]HUV· GXH GLOLJHQFH HIIRUWV
 
payments for at least several months, which increases the likelihood that the 
borrower will not default before the loan is securitized or before the 
H[SLUDWLRQ RI WKH RULJLQDWRU·V REOLJDWLRQ WR UHSXUFKDVH DQ\ GHIDXOWHG
mortgage. 
93. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of 
Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1309 (1995) (describing the overtly racist borrower 
rating criteria used by federal agencies beginning in the 1930s);; Adam 
Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in 
Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to 
Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 207 (2005) (describing 
WKHRULJLQRIWKHWHUP´UHGOLQLQJµ. 
94. See generally CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE 
AMERICAN DREAM: A MULTI-­STATE ANALYSIS OF HIGHER COST HOME PURCHASE 
LENDING (2007), available at http://www.calreinvest.org/system/assets/47.pdf.  
)RU GLVFXVVLRQV RI PRUWJDJH UHGOLQLQJ DQG VXESULPH OHQGHUV· UHYHUVH
redlining, see, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul de Sac of Race Preference 
Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1302 n.232 (2006);; Brescia, supra note 5, 
at 282-­83 & n.41;; Ding et al., supra note 15, at 194-­95;; Allison De Tal, supra 
note 60, at 645 n.100. 
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vanished.95  The increasingly common practice of fabricating 
ERUURZHUV· ILQDQFLDO UHFRUGV in order to make them appear 
capable of repaying expensive mortgage loans was partially 
PRRWHG E\ VHFXULWL]HUV· FRQFRFWLRQ RI ´ORZ-­µ DQG ´QR-­
GRFXPHQWDWLRQµORDQSURGXFWVVXFKDV´VWDWHGLQFRPHµ´VWDWHG
DVVHWVµ´QRLQFRPHµ´QRDVVHWVµDQGDEVXUGFRPELnations such 
DV ´QR-­income, no-­DVVHWVµ RU ´1,1$µ ORDQV ZKLFK QRW RQO\
permitted, but required, mortgage originators to make no 
PHQWLRQRIWKHERUURZHU·VLQFRPHRUDVVHWV96  The obvious risk 
inherent in purchasing securities backed by such recklessly 
originated mortgages was used to justify even more onerous 
loan terms, facilitating the extension of credit to nearly anyone 
with a pulse who could be convinced to sign the paperwork. 
 
B. Borrowers 
 
For the reasons given above, borrowers could traditionally 
rely on their lenders to carefully scrutinize their financial 
means and lend on terms that did not threaten their ability to 
manage their expenses, even in the long term.97  When the 
structure of the mortgage lending industry began to 
fundamentally change, leading to unprecedented risk-­taking 
and deception by mortgage originators, borrowers were slow to 
adjust.  In large part, that failure was due to the changes 
occurring on the back-­end of mortgage transactions, which 
were invisible to borrowers.  The industr\·V LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK
borrowers was entirely limited to originators, and therefore did 
not reflect the significant shift in incentives that had taken 
 
95. See Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 11-­12.  See generally, e.g., 
'HOO·$ULFFLD,JDQ	/DHYHQ supra note 19;; Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra 
note 3;; Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?  
Evidence From Subprime Loans (Dec. 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Social Science Research Network), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093137) (follow 
´'RZQORDGµ3XUQDQDQGDPsupra note 74. 
96. Many borrowers had no idea that their mortgage loans had been 
underwritten according to such outlandish criteria.  In fact, many borrowers 
had very stable and easily verified income and provided documentation to 
their lenders, only to have those lenders ignore the documents in order to 
HLWKHUPRUHHDVLO\IDOVLI\WKHERUURZHU·VILQDQFLDOLQIRUPDWLRQRUSODFH
the borrower in a low-­ or no-­documentation loan product in order to reap the 
higher fees and interest rate, or both. 
97. See discussion supra Parts I, III(A). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/14
2009] SMOKE AND MIRRORS 67 
place when private label securitization began. 
Many scholars have speculated upon the ability of 
mortgage brokers and originators to repeatedly dupe borrowers 
into accepting harmful mortgage loans.  While this question is 
beyond the scope of this Article, several factors that surely 
contributed to this phenomenon can be easily noted.  First, as 
explained above, there was a very strong racial component to 
predatory lending by aggressive mortgage originators.98  
Minorities were primed for such practices due to the traditional 
EDQNV· ORQJVWDQGLQJSUDFWLFHRIUHGOLQLQJWKRVHFRPPXQLWLHV99  
Second, brokers and originators engaged in high pressure sales 
tactics³tactics that had been better regulated in other 
contexts but had not existed in the mortgage lending industry 
until relatively recently³thus enabling them to evade 
meaningful oversight.100  Third, a borrower struggling to make 
his or her unexpectedly rising mortgage payments was unlikely 
to find anyone willing, or arguably able, to work with the 
borrower to make his or her mortgage more affordable.  The 
borrower had no contact with the true owner of the mortgage 
loan, and as discussed below, even those owners stood to 
benefit from borrower defaults in a manner that traditional 
portfolio lenders did not.101  Many unsophisticated and 
desperate borrowers, already saddled with bad loans, were 
therefore trapped, forced to either sell and move out of their 
homes, or to refinance their mortgages and hope for better 
deals. 
 
C. Securitizers 
 
For the purpose of this subsection, the various entities 
involved in the purchase, pooling and securitization of 
mortgage loans, the rating and sale of those securities to 
 
98. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
99. See id. 
100. See generally discussion supra Part III(A)(2).  These tactics include 
repeated vague promises of low payments, changing paperwork at the last 
minute in order to conceal the true terms of a loan, rushed closings meant to 
deprive the borrower from reading paperwork, convoluted contracts and other 
documents, discouragement from retaining counsel or seeking any outside 
advice, and promoting the sense of a limited one-­time offer to purchase or 
VDYHWKHERUURZHU·VKRPHWKDWFRXOGQRWEHPDWFKHGHOVHZKHUH 
101. See discussion infra Part III(D). 
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investors, and the managing of trusts and loan documents are 
treated collectively.  These entities all participate in the 
process of purchasing loans from originators and packaging 
them in a manner that will entice a variety of investors to 
purchase securities backed by those loans.  The purchasers of 
the securities, or the investors, do not acquire legal ownership 
of the loans.102  Rather, the loans in a particular pool are 
XVXDOO\ RZQHG E\ D WUXVW WKDW LV VHW XS IRU WKH LQYHVWRUV·
EHQHILW DQG ZKRVH SXUSRVH LV WR HQDEOH WKH ERUURZHUV· ORDQ
payments to be passed on to investors according to the terms of 
the various securities transactions.103  Therefore, the 
securitizers retain ownership of the mortgage loans and sell 
only the associated revenue stream.104  Despite this formality, 
the risk of borrower default is mostly passed on to investors 
because it is they, and generally not the securitizers, who will 
suffer losses should borrowers fail to make full payments on 
their loans. 
Securitizers must take steps to assure investors that the 
underlying assets³the loans³are sound and profitable.  To 
that end, securitizers employ credit ratings agencies to opine 
on the risk posed by the various kinds, or tranches, of 
securities backed by a particular pool of loans, and usually 
SURYLGH ´FUHGLW HQKDQFHPHQWVµ WR JXDUG DJDLQVW SRVVLEOH
borrower defaults up to a certain level.105  The ratings agencies 
profit only if the securities are sold, which creates an obvious 
and troubling conflict of interest.  Securitizers also impose 
underwriting criteria on loans they purchase.  These criteria 
vary in order to appeal to a broad range of investors with 
differing tolerances for risk, and they relate to DIR and LTV 
requirements, the amount of documentation of income and 
DVVHWV WREHFROOHFWHG IURPWKHERUURZHU WKHERUURZHU·VFUHGLW
score, and other factors bearing upon the risk of default.  MBS 
issuers prepare detailed reports regarding numerous features 
of the loans and pools of loans backing the securities they offer 
in order to provide investors with information about assets 
 
102. For a description of mortgage securitization, see generally 
Unterman, supra note 1. 
103. Id. at 56-­60. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 60-­63. 
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underlying each class of securities offered.106  The various 
parties to the securitization process also draw up intricate 
contracts explaining the role of each entity in the transaction.  
Investors are thereby given extensive information about the 
likely profitability of the loans in a given pool, though the 
LQIRUPDWLRQ·V UHOLDELOLW\ LV FRQVWUDLQHG E\ WKH DFFXUDF\ RI WKH
RULJLQDWRUV· DQG DSSUDLVHUV· UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ WKH
SRRO·V ORDQVDQGSURSHUWLHV $Q\REIXVFDWLRQH[DJJHUDWLRQRU
PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ QRW GHWHFWHG E\ WKH VHFXULWL]HUV· GXH
diligence efforts may be passed on to investors. 
The securitizers profit by successfully issuing securities to 
investors.  Pointing out risky features of the mortgage loans 
backing the securities, however, obviously reduces profits.  
Similarly, reducing the number of loans available to back 
securities, which in turn reduces the number of securities that 
FDQ EH LVVXHG UHGXFHV VHFXULWL]HUV· SURILWV  6HFXULWL]HUV
therefore have an incentive to encourage originators to make as 
many loans as possible and to make those loans appear as 
sound as possible.107 
The refinancing of subprime mortgages into new and 
bigger subprime mortgages had a multiplier effect that was 
just as profitable for securitizers as it was for originators, since 
securitizers also depended on volume to generate profits.  A 
high rate of relatively quick refinancing had the potential of 
driving away securities investors who might otherwise have 
deemed the securities to be unprofitable, given the relatively 
small total payments made on loans still in their early years.  
Securitizers, however, offered many classes of securities in 
relation to each pool of mortgage loans.  Thus, an investor 
could essentially bet on the likelihood of an early payoff.108  
Furthermore, much of the costs of early payoffs were passed on 
 
106. Such a report, often included in such filings from the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission as prospectuses (or prospectus 
supplements, or free-­writing prospectuses), can easily run to 1,000 pages.  
For a thorough discussion of the information exchange between securities 
issuers and investors, see generally Gerding, supra note 4. 
107. Again, the cash-­out feature of refinance loans is crucial to making a 
loan affordable for a long enough period of time to allow the sale of securities 
without any sign of unaffordability.  See supra note 106 and accompanying 
text. 
108. For example, purchasers of classes of securities backed by interest 
payments stood to lose from early payoffs, while purchasers of classes of 
securities backed by principal payments, stood to gain from early payoffs. 
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to borrowers in the form of prepayment penalties (which were 
themselves securitized).109  In addition to providing investors 
with a choice regarding exposure to the risk of prepayment, 
subprime mortgage loans were, as discussed above, precisely 
tuned to maximize the predictability of default, and thus payoff 
(often through refinance),110 which enabled investors to assess 
the likely number and timing of refinances in the pool.  
Notably, there was little need to forecast the performance of a 
subprime mortgage loan deep into its thirty-­year term because 
the borrower was expected to fully repay the loan, either 
through refinance or sale, long before then.  The convoluted 
structure of subprime mortgage loans thus facilitated not only 
originator misrepresentations to borrowers, but also the 
minimization of uncertainty about loan performance for MBS 
purchasers, and thus the marketing of those securities to a 
broad group of investors. 
 
D. Investors 
 
The massive explosion of the MBS market, and thus the 
mortgage lending market itself, was partly fueled by the short-­
term and repeated refinancing of subprime mortgage loans that 
were not sustainable over their full terms.  Loans were 
essentially repaid with home equity rather than with borrower 
income.111  This process was so carefully and tightly 
 
109. A prepayment penalty is a fee imposed on a borrower who pays 
more than a certain amount³for example, twenty percent of the outstanding 
balance³during a certain period, usually the first year, two years, or three 
years after origination of the loan.  See also discussion supra Part III(B). 
110. See discussion supra Part III(A).  The time of default (i.e., 
refinance) could not be perfectly predicted because ARMs were based on 
indices whose future fluctuations could not be known in advance.  All other 
things being equal, reductions in an index (and thus in mortgage interest 
rates) would lead to a greater number of refinances (since cheaper mortgages 
would be available), and vice versa. 
111. $ODUJHSRUWLRQRIDVXESULPHPRUWJDJHORDQ·VSD\PHQWVZHUHPDGH
RXW RI WKH SURSHUW\·V HTXLW\³loans that did not fully amortize did not pay 
particularly well while they were in repayment, but led to large payoffs when 
they were refinanced.  It was the next loan that made the prior loan 
OXFUDWLYHQRW MXVWWKHERUURZHU·VSD\PHQWV 7KHVDPHLVWUXHRIPRUWJDJHV
with large interest rate increases³even though the borrower may not make 
many of the payments due after the increase, those payments will have to be 
made when the next mortgage pays off the current one.  Similarly, equity was 
often liquidated by a refinance loan in the form of cash and then used to 
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manipulated by the entities that created and sold the securities 
that it was massively profitable for these entities and their 
investor clients.  But the perpetuation of that profitability 
depended upon two crucial conditions: that residential property 
values increase rapidly and perpetually.  Property values 
needed to increase rapidly enough to sustain the periodic 
refinances which, because they were loaded with fees, costs, 
and consolidation of all imaginable kinds of other debts, were 
often significantly larger in amount than their predecessor 
loans.  The methodical and unrelenting cycle of subprime loan 
flipping likely contributed substantially to the rise in property 
values, especially once those values reached levels that 
virtually no one, without exceptionally high income, could 
possibly afford to sustain over the full course of any reasonable 
thirty-­year mortgage. 
As for the other condition upon which the MBS market 
depended, it is now obvious that property values could not 
continue their vertiginous climb in perpetuity.  But because 
each subsequent round of subprime loans was larger in market 
value and less viable than the previous loans, the need for 
rising property values became increasingly acute and the 
potential consequences of price stagnation or depreciation 
became increasingly dire.  This was a classical pyramid scheme 
situation: (1) each new round of investors paid off the previous 
round of investors;; (2) each new round of investment, because 
it paid off prior investments, was larger than the previous one;; 
(3) finding enough new investments to sustain the cycle became 
increasingly difficult, leading to the erosion of underwriting 
standards in making new mortgage loans;; and (4) ultimately, 
the entire market crashed when it was revealed that the value 
of assets backing the investments was grossly insufficient to 
justify the prices of the securities.  One notable difference 
between this pyramid scheme and others is that the MBS 
investors had ample information about what they were 
purchasing.112  Arguably, they understood, or should have 
understood, that they were investing in an unsustainable asset 
bubble.  Therefore, they were simply betting that they would be 
DEOHWRJHWRXWEHIRUHWKHPDUNHW·VFROODSVH 
 
make payments on the subsequent loan.  See generally discussion supra Part 
III(A)(2). 
112. See discussion supra Part III(D). 
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E. The Collapse 
 
As the subprime MBS market grew, the individual 
subprime mortgage loans became increasingly difficult for 
borrowers to repay and the rate and rapidity of borrower 
defaults increased.113  Perhaps for this reason or perhaps for 
entirely unrelated reasons, investors decided to pull out.  The 
vast majority of MBS were rated extremely safe, and even a 
minimal increase in defaults may have persuaded cautious 
institutional investors to abstain.  Whatever the reason for 
LQYHVWRUV·GHSDUWXUHIURPWKH0%6PDUNHWVHFXUitizers either 
did not notice their absence or they merely assumed that it was 
due to a temporary decline in the market.  Many of the largest 
securitizers, therefore, continued to purchase and pool 
subprime mortgage loans for a long time after they began 
having difficulty selling their securities.  By the time 
securitizers realized that they had missed the contraction, they 
already had significant backlogs of mortgage loans that they 
could not securitize.  This caused them to suddenly cease or 
cancel subprime loan purchases, leading to a quick succession 
of originator failures and bankruptcies.114  At this point, many 
borrowers were stuck with mortgage loans that they could 
neither afford nor refinance.  In addition, borrowers could not 
escape their mortgages by selling their properties because 
purchasers could no longer obtain financing.  The result was a 
massive real estate depreciation that left homeowners in 
default on their mortgage loans with outstanding balances far 
LQ H[FHVVRI WKHLUKRPHV·QHZYDOXHV  The prospects for MBS 
owners³which at this point included all of the securitizers who 
had been caught with unmarketable mortgages³to recover 
anything approaching the face value of their securities were 
 
113. See, e.g., Purnanandam, supra note 74, at 8-­13 (discussing the four-­
fold increase in mortgage charge-­offs from the first through the fourth 
quarters of 2007);; Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 7-­9.  In addition, Demyanyk 
DQG9DQ+HPHUWDVVHUWWKDW´VHFXULWL]HUVZHUHWRVRPHH[WHQWDZDUHRIµWKe 
progressively deteriorating quality of mortgage loans over a period of six 
years leading to the current crisis.  Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 3, 
at 5. 
114. See Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at QRWLQJWKDWILUPV´UHSUHVHQWLQJ
about 40 percent of 2006 subprime originations, have either closed down 
RSHUDWLRQVGHFODUHGEDQNUXSWF\RUEHHQEDLOHGRUERXJKWRXWµ 
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dim and in decline. 
 
IV. Solutions 
 
The incentives created by the private-­label subprime 
mortgage securitization market led its various participants to 
engage in, abet, or simply turn a blind eye to, a wide range of 
grossly abusive practices by mortgage originators.  Altering the 
incentives of any of the participants in a manner that would 
make such conduct unfeasible could prevent such a massive 
buildup of highly overvalued assets from accumulating in the 
IXWXUH  (IIRUWV KDG ORQJ EHHQ PDGH WR LPSURYH ERUURZHUV·
bargaining positions by requiring lenders to make extensive 
disclosures regarding the loans they offered.115  This had no 
appreciable effect for the following reasons: (1) the high 
pressure tactics employed by predatory lenders included 
rushing borrowers through closings in order to deprive them of 
a meaningful opportunity to read the disclosure documents;; (2) 
additional disclosures merely added to the large volume of 
paperwork present at mortgage closings, making it harder for 
borrowers to pick out the few truly important documents;; and 
(3) subprime loan terms had become so convoluted that most 
borrowers would not have understood them even if given the 
opportunity to carefully and repeatedly scrutinize them. 
$WWHPSWV WR UHIRUP RULJLQDWRUV· FRUUXSW LQFHQWLYHV KDYH
also been made, namely through the passage of the very same 
consumer protection laws meant to inform borrowers.116  Many 
 
115. At the federal level, these efforts are primarily embodied by the 
Truth in Lending Act of 1968 ´7,/$µ3XE/1R-­321 § 102, 82 Stat. 146 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006)), HOEPA § 151, and the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-­533 § 2, 88 Stat. 
1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006)).  Many states have also 
enacted various disclosure laws similar to, and in some instances more 
comprehensive than, the federal statutes.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-­6A-­1²
13 (2009);; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-­127 (West 2008);; MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 12-­311 (West 2002);; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-­409.1 (West 
2008);; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-­1029 (West 2002);; MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 183C, § 1-­19 (West 2006);; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-­21A-­1²14 (West 
2008);; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-­l (McKinney 2008);; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-­23-­10²
85 (2009). 
116. Many of these laws simply imposed the ineffective disclosure 
requirements, established in the consumer protection statutes such as those 
cited in supra note 115. 
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of the predatory origination tactics discussed above violate 
federal and state laws and can lead to monetary damages and 
even invalidation of the debt.117  However, these laws only 
impose liability on originators who,118 because they tend to be 
thinly capitalized fly-­by-­night operations and because they are 
often sued by numerous victims, are rarely able to make 
aggrieved borrowers whole and often cease to exist entirely by 
the time that borrower discovers the wrongdoing and seeks 
legal assistance.119  Indeed, the ephemeral nature of many 
subprime mortgage originators makes them poor targets of 
direct policy influence.  Rather, these companies are the most 
responsive to the incentives created by their financiers³the 
securitizers and, indirectly, the securities investors. 
Most jurisdictions hold assignees liable for the acts of their 
assignors, up to the amount of the debt.120  However, that 
general rule has been gutted by the holder in due course 
´+,'&µ GRFWULQH HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH 8QLIRUP &RPPHUFLDO
&RGH ´8&&µ121  That doctrine provides that purchasers of 
negotiable instruments who take ownership according to 
certain minimal criteria are only liable for a very limited 
 
117. These laws, including common law fraud, unfair and deceptive 
practices statutes, TILA, and civil rights statutes, are inadequate in a 
number of ways, but that subject is beyond the scope of this Article. 
118. There are a few very narrow provisions for assignee liability in 
some statutes, but they have proved to be insignificant.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 
1641(d) (2006);; N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-­306 (McKinney 2001) (providing that an 
DVVLJQHHZKRLVQRWD´KROGHULQGXHFRXUVHµRIDQHJRWLDEOHLQVWUXPHQW³and 
where mortgage loan notes are usually deemed negotiable instruments³is 
VXEMHFWWRPRVWGHIHQVHVWRWKHLQVWUXPHQW·VHQIRUFHPHQW 
119. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 2273 (describing undercapitalized 
RULJLQDWRUV DV ´GLVSRVDEOH ILOWHU>V@ DEVRUELQJ DQG GHIOHFWLQJ RULJLQDWLRQ
claims and defenses until those claims and defenses render the business 
VWUXFWXUHXQXVDEOHµ 
120. See, e.g., Vig v. Ni[3URMHFW,,3·VKLS3G$UL]&W$SS
´An assignee steps into the shoes of her assignor.  She can stand in no 
better position than the assignor and [a]n assignment cannot alter the 
GHIHQVHV RU HTXLWLHV RI WKH WKLUG SDUW\·µ LQWHUQDO quotation marks and 
citation omitted);; Mid-­Am. Appliance Corp. v. Federated Fin. Co., 109 N.W.2d 
381, 1HE ´An assignee generally acquires no greater right than 
that possessed by the assignor.  The assignee stands in the shoes of the 
assignor and is bound by the terms of the contract to the same extent as the 
DVVLJQRUµ LQWHUQDO FLWDWLRQV RPLWWHG ,QW·O 5LEERQ 0LOOV /WG Y $UMDQ
5LEERQV,QF1(G1<´,WLVHOHPHQWDU\DQFLHQWODZ
that an assignee never stands in aQ\EHWWHUSRVLWLRQWKDQKLVDVVLJQRUµ 
121. U.C.C. § 3-­302 (2004). 
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number of defenses against enforcement.122  These defenses 
generally do not include any of the consumer protection claims 
arising from predatory lending that borrowers have against 
originators.  As a result of the judgment-­proof nature of 
VXESULPH RULJLQDWRUV· EXVLQHVVHV DQG Whe liability laundering 
effect of the sale of mortgage loans into the secondary market, 
flagrantly illegal lending practices were permitted to go 
unremedied.  Securitizers and investors operated in a veritable 
regulatory and legal black hole.  The resulting lack of 
accountability permitted originators, securitizers, and 
investors to act recklessly and then shift the costs of their 
recklessness entirely onto the borrowers whose promises to 
pay, whether unwitting or careless, were at the core of the 
MBS market. 
Shifting that cost back onto the lenders, by making the 
current owners of mortgage loans liable to borrowers, would 
have two principal and salutary effects.  First, it would 
counteract the otherwise unchecked incentive to make 
unsustainable loans by discouraging fraud and other illegal 
practices.  This would be accomplished by enlisting securitizers 
and investors in the effort to curb origination fraud.  If these 
SDUWLHV ERUH WKH FRVWV RI RULJLQDWRUV· LOOHJDO SUDFWLFHV WKH\
would be far more likely to sFUXWLQL]HRULJLQDWRUV·FRQGXFWDQG
to demand that originators comply with the law.  Second, 
securitizers would have an incentive to purchase loans from 
well-­capitalized originators with sustainable business 
practices.  Such originators are far more likely to remain in 
business for a long time and thus to be available to indemnify 
securitziers and investors who are eventually held liable to 
borrowers.  This would reverse the current incentive to do 
business with transient originators whose disappearances 
deprive borrowers of redress and thus discourage borrowers 
from challenging the validity of their loans. 
Far from being novel, such wholesale assignee liability 
already exists, and is in fact mandatory, in a number of other 
industries.  High-­pressure deceptive practices of the kinds 
mentioned in this article have long been widespread, especially 
 
122. See id.  One requirement is that the assignment be taken in good 
faith, which arguably is often not the case.  Delving into this inquiry, 
however, is expensive, and evidence of bad faith by entities whose dealings 
are largely closed to scrutiny is difficult to unearth. 
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in the very same minority communities in which predatory 
mortgage lending has been rampant.123  It was once common 
for salesmen of consumer goods, automobiles, insurance, and 
numerous other products to unlawfully induce customers into 
financing purchases of their merchandise on unfavorable 
terms.124  These debts were then sold onto the secondary 
PDUNHW DQG ZHUH WKXV ODXQGHUHG RI FRQVXPHUV· SURWHFWLRQV
against enforcement by the holder in due course doctrine.125  
7KH)HGHUDO7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQ ´)7&µGHFLVLYHO\ FXUEHG WKLV
problem by issuing its Holder Notice rule in 1975.126  This rule 
required all financing contracts in certain affected industries to 
contain language defeating the negotiability of the debt 
instrument, thereby effectively abrogating the holder in due 
course status of any subsequent purchaser.127  It is only a 
historical accident that resulted in the omission of mortgage 
lending from the list of protected industries;; private label 
mortgage securitization was not yet significant and thus 
predatory mortgage lending practices were not yet rampant.  It 
ZRXOGVLPSO\WDNHWKHH[WHQVLRQRIWKH)7&·VKROGHUQRWLFHUXOH
to the mortgage lending industry to realign lender incentives 
and return some measure of responsibility and prudence to 
that market.128 
 
123. See, e.g., Heastie v. Cmty. Bank of Greater Peoria, 727 F. Supp. 
1133, 1135-­36 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing abuses prompting the adoption of 
the holder notice rule);; David A. Szwak, The )7& ´+ROGHUµ 5XOH, 60 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 361, 361-­62 (2006);; Julia Patterson Forrester, 
Constructing a New Theoretical Framework For Home Improvement 
Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1105-­07 (1996) (discussing fraudulent 
practices and the effect of the holder notice rule in the home improvement 
industry). 
124. See, e.g., Szwak, supra note 123. 
125. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-­169, at 1912 ( QRWLQJ WKDW ´>W@KH
F.T.C. rule has not significantly restricted the flow of consumer credit and or 
LQWHUIHUHGZLWKWKHVHFXULWL]DWLRQRIDXWRORDQVµ 
126. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2006). 
127. Id. 
128. It bears noting that Peterson does not consider the extension of the 
Holder Notice rule to mortgage loans, or the extension of assignee liability 
generally, as a sufficient remedy to the problems discussed in this Article.  
+HDUJXHVWKDWWKHH[WHQVLRQ´ZRXOGQRWEULQJWKHODZXSWRGDWHµDQGWKDWLW
ZRXOGPHUHO\FRQVWLWXWH´DWUDQVLWLRQIURPEODPLQJWKHYLFWLPWREODPLQJWKH
patV\µ QDPHO\ WKH LQYHVWRU DQG WKXVZRXOG LQ VRPHVHQVH ´JR WRR IDU E\
forcing relatively innocent investors to bear the brunt of large punitive 
GDPDJHDZDUGVµ3HWHUVRQsupra note 8, at 2275.  Strangely, Peterson favors 
the extension of shared liability doctrines such as common law conspiracy, 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Numerous mistakes were made during the MBS market 
boom, which all combined to amplify the resulting damage.  
Other authors have identified steps that investors could have 
taken in order to limit their exposure to overvalued 
securities.129  But few have addressed the structural features of 
the mortgage and securities markets that encouraged the 
overvaluation of subprime mortgage loans in the first place.  
One such feature was the elimination of the bankruptcy tax 
resulting from depositing loans into bankruptcy-­remote SPVs.  
Unfortunately, few plausible solutions have been offered to 
negate the distortion of securitizer and investor incentives 
caused by this feature.  At any rate, the elimination of the 
bankruptcy tax is not the only significant distortion that must 
be addressed in order to restore prudence and sustainability to 
mortgage lending.  Another such distortion is the reduction, to 
near elimination, of legal liability for fraudulent and other 
abusive lending practices. 
There are compelling reasons to effectively prevent 
predatory lending practices by subprime mortgage loan 
originators that are unrelated to the proper functioning of 
financial markets.  Those practices have devastated large 
communities and brought thousands of families to financial 
ruin.  But even leaving those concerns aside, predatory 
mortgage lending has caused unacceptable damage and loss, 
which warrants strict regulation and enforcement.  The 
changes in the fundamental organization and operation of the 
 
aider-­abettor, and joint venture theories, over consumer protection statutes.  
Id. at 2275-­79.  It is difficult to see how this approach differs from the 
currently inadequate doctrines which shift the burden onto borrowers to 
SURYH DVVLJQHHV· EDG IDLWK RU FRPSOLFLW\ EHIRUH DOORZLQJ WKHP DQ\ UHFRYHU\
from those assignees.  Ultimately, it is a disagreement about how to most 
effectively influence the behavior of securitizers.  Peterson argues for joint or 
imputed liabLOLW\ IRU WKRVH DFWV XQGHUWDNHQ LQ IXUWKHUDQFH RI RULJLQDWRUV·
illegal behavior, which places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.  I, however, 
DUJXH WKDW KROGLQJ LQYHVWRUV OLDEOH IRU RULJLQDWRUV· LOOHJDO EHKDYLRU ZLOO
inherently prevent securitizers from encouraging such illegality because 
investors will refuse to invest in such enterprises, without the substantial 
impediments for the borrower-­SODLQWLII WKDW 3HWHUVRQ·V SUHIHUUHG PRGHO
imposes. 
129. See supra notes 1-­8. 
37
78 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30:41 
mortgage lending market led to equally significant changes in 
OHQGHUV· LQFHQWLYHV DQG EHKDYLRU  'HFHLWIXO PDUNHWLQJ ZHQW
from being bad business to being the engine that drove the 
massive growth of the subprime MBS boom.  But it also 
ensured that the growth was predicated upon unsustainable 
long-­term promises by borrowers and unrealistic expectations 
of perpetually increasing property values.  The result was a 
pyramid scheme that ensnared millions of institutional 
investors worldwide who placed hundreds of billions of dollars 
at stake.  The inevitable collapse of this illusory market has 
been catastrophic, with consequences likely to last years and 
cost trillions of dollars. 
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